Purpose　-　The　effect　of　prestigious　CEOs　on　firm　performance　is　not　clear.　By　integrating　resource　dependence　and　agency　theories,　this　paper　aims　to　focus　on　how　prestigious　CEOs　affect　firm　performance　and　how　informal　relations　between　the　CEO　and　outside　directors　affect　agency　costs　and　resource　benefits　associated　with　prestigious　CEOs.　Design/methodology/approach　-　The　authors　use　ordinary　least　squares　(OLS)　regression　to　analyze　their　data　set,　which　is　conducted　by　a　sample　of　4,226　Chinese　listed　firms　from　2009　to　2013.　The　authors　also　use　OLS　regression　to　assess　the　sensitivity　and　robustness　of　their　findings.　Findings　-　The　findings　indicate　that　prestigious　CEOs　are　significantly　and　positively　associated　with　firm　performance.　Moreover,　the　authors　find　the　effect　of　prestigious　CEOs　on　firm　performance　is　more　pronounced　when　prestigious　outside　directors　interact　with　prestigious　CEOs.　Guanxi　-　a　Chinese　concept　similar　to　camaraderie　-　attenuates　this　association,　particularly　when　the　CEO　and　outside　directors　share　the　same　surname.　Research　limitations/implications　-　Future　research　should　consider　whether　there　is　a　mediating　link　between　prestigious　affiliates　(i.e.　CEOs)　and　firm　performance.　Practical/implications　-　This　paper　provides　two　practical　implications.　First,　China　Securities　Regulatory　Commission　policymakers　should　pay　more　attention　to　outside　directors＇　quality　and　ability　and　their　informal　guanxi　with　the　CEO.　Second,　prestigious　CEOs　may　also　have　potential　costs.　Originality/value　-　This　study　contributes　to　corporate　governance　literature　and　CEO-board　relations　literature　by　shedding　light　on　how　resource　dependence　and　agency　theories　apply　to　corporate　governance.