Facing　multiple　collecting　channels　for　used　products,　consumers　may　choose　the　online　collection　service　provided　by　third-party　platforms　for　convenience,　which　also　brings　competition　to　other　channels.　To　explore　the　influence　of　consumer　behavior　on　the　competitive　dual-collecting　supply　chain,　we　build　two　closed-loop　supply　chain　models　with　dual-collecting　channels:　one　in　which　the　used　products　are　collected　by　the　retailer　and　the　third-party　(model　RT)　and　another　in　which　the　used　products　are　collected　by　the　manufacturer　and　the　third-party　(model　MT).　Results　show　that,　with　increasing　consumer　preference　to　the　third-party　collecting　channel　in　model　RT,　the　manufacturer＇s　optimal　decisions　maintained,　while　the　optimal　collecting　prices　of　the　retailer　and　the　third-party　decrease.　In　model　MT,　the　manufacturer＇s　optimal　decisions　are　not　affected　by　consumer　preference,　but　the　third-party＇s　collecting　price　decreases.　In　addition,　the　numerical　analysis　shows　that　in　both　models,　the　total　collecting　quantity　and　the　overall　profit　decrease.　Accordingly,　we　use　revenue　sharing　contracts　and　two-part　tariff　contracts　to　coordinate　the　reverse　channels.　We　find　that　the　latter　one　can　coordinate　both　model　RT　and　model　MT,　while　the　former　one　cannot,　and　besides,　the　influence　of　consumer　preference　on　contract　parameters　is　studied.